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Abstract Most people believe that the recent financial crisis had its roots in a boom
in housing lending in the United States. After the dot-com bubble, the argument goes,
the Federal Reserve Bank lowered the interest rates to stimulate corporate investment
and recover from the downturn. As a side effect of low interest rates, mortgages became
cheaper and Americans became attracted to the housing market. Credit for housing
was provided by the sophisticated financial system of the United States, which allowed
investors to purchase packages of mortgages from diversified geographical locations,
and from individuals with different probabilities of default, according to their desired
level of risk. As it turned out, these products caught the attention of investors from
all over the world, who were attracted by their profitable returns and the implicit
guarantees provided by the U.S. government to the issuing agencies and financial
intermediaries. Therefore, housing credit was plentiful and, as a consequence, house
prices in the United States rose. This in turn allowed mortgage borrowers to refinance
their debts and avoid default. The party came to an end when interest rates increased
and house prices fell, triggering a series of defaults in mortgages and driving values
of the financial products near to zero, resulting in consequences with which we all are
too familiar.
In Fault Lines, Raghuram Rajan argues that this widely accepted explanation for the
crisis fails to acknowledge that there are deeper economical, political, and social fric-
tions outside the financial system, both domestic to the United States and international,
which played a central role in the evolution of events described above. These frictions
are comparable to geological fault lines or fissures in the Earth’s surface, where dif-
ferent tectonic plates come into contact, building up enormous stresses around them.
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The first fault line stems from U.S. domestic political and social pressures, which
fed on a growing inequality. Between 1975 and 2005, the difference between the wages
in 90th and the 10th percentiles of the distribution increased substantially, leaving the
working class severely marginalized. The author argues that the increase in inequality
was driven partly by the U.S. educational system, which is at the bottom of the ladder
internationally, coupled with the increasing cost of a college education. These factors
led to stagnation in the supply of a well-educated labor force right at the time when
the demand for such labor was increasing, driving the wages of the lucky (and often
already well-heeled) few upward. At the same time, the expansion in global trade and
immigration intensified competition for blue-collar workers, keeping the wages of
the working class stagnant. But rather than addressing these structural imbalances, for
example, by improving the U.S. educational system, vote-seeking politicians chose the
solution that delivered visible results in the shortest term possible: boosting consump-
tion by the marginalized by supporting social programs that increased their access to
housing credit.
Another set of fault lines is related to international trade imbalances. Countries such
as Japan and Germany and, recently, some Asian countries (including China) have been
able to grow by relying excessively on exports to foreign countries and by protecting
their inefficient domestic-oriented production sector from global competition. Excess
consumption of goods produced in other countries does not necessarily drive prices up
in the local market, and thus central banks do not see the need to increase the interest
rate in order to curb consumers’ desire to take on more debt so as to keep consuming.
At the same time, the inefficient domestic sectors of exporter countries are unable to
create enough internal demand to reduce their dependence on foreign countries for
growth, which increases the trade imbalances. This spiral continues until the levels of
debt of consumer countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain,
become unsustainable, and crisis hits everywhere.
The third set of fault lines emerges when these trade imbalances are financed by
individuals in different financial systems. For example, the East Asian crises of the
1990s occurred because foreign investors, not used to the lack of transparency in
these bank-oriented economies, protected themselves against the risk of default by
offering short-term, foreign-currency-denominated funds that could easily be with-
drawn and were not subject to devaluation, and lent the funds through local banks that
had implicit government guarantees. Similarly, in the recent financial crisis, foreign
investors naively overrelied on the accuracy of prices in the arm’s-length financial sys-
tem of the United States, and offered their funds through institutions that had implicit
U.S. government guarantees.
The fault lines all came together in the U.S. financial sector because the limited
unemployment safety net in this economy, coupled with the jobless recoveries of the
1980s and early 1990s, put a lot of pressure on the Fed to intervene and create as much
fiscal and monetary stimulus as possible to create the necessary jobs. By doing so, the
incentives to take greater risks in the financial sector increased.
Rajan warns that these fault lines did not disappear after the recent financial crisis,
and that they need to be tackled to avoid another, possibly deeper crisis, or even
destructive warfare. The challenge facing us, however, is that, ultimately, these fault
lines exist because everybody is acting according to what is best for them individually.
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Nevertheless, in the last chapters, the author discusses possible constructive reforms,
sometimes painful in the short term, that could be implemented to reach long-term
solutions. The author also discusses how public pressure could be created to achieve
the implementation of these reforms.
Fault Lines is a very well written and cogent book that provides a global perspective
on the causes of the crisis, the dangers if the root causes of it are not addressed, pos-
sible solutions, and ideas for implementing them. The book explains many economic
concepts and developments in simple language that should be accessible to the wider
public. More knowledgeable readers who are familiar with these issues will enjoy the
book’s descriptions of historical events and references to entertaining academic exper-
iments and articles that support the author’s arguments. A strict empirical academic
might complain about the lack of empirical evidence for some of the author’s boldest
causal claims, but such gaps could also be viewed as an excellent source of inspiration
for young researchers looking for research ideas. In sum, this book is a must read for
analysts, academics, politicians, economists, and the like.
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